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Abstract. Models may not only represent, but also influence their targets in important ways. While 
models’ ability to influence outcomes has been studied in relation to economic models, often 
under the label “performativity”, we argue that this phenomenon also pertains to epidemiological 
models, such as those used for forecasting the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic. After 
identifying three ways in which a model by the COVID-19 Response Team at Imperial College 
London (Ferguson et al. 2020) may have influenced scientific advice, policy, and individual 
responses, we consider the implications of epidemiological models’ performative capacities. We 
argue, first, that performativity may impair models’ ability to successfully predict the course of an 
epidemic; and second, that it provides an additional respect in which these models can be 
successful, namely by changing the course of an epidemic. 




Philosophers are increasingly scrutinising epidemiological models that have been used to forecast 
the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic (Horner and Symons 2020; Nguyen and Frigg 2021; 
Winsberg et al. 2020; Schroeder 2021; van Basshuysen and White 2021). The success of these 
models is often evaluated in terms of their predictive accuracy (Friedman et al. 2020). We argue 
that there is an additional dimension along which epidemiological models can be successful, 
namely in influencing the course of an epidemic. Our argument draws on the concept of 
“performativity”, which economic sociologists and philosophers of economics have used to 
describe the phenomenon that economic models may not only represent parts of the economy, 
but can also influence the behaviours of the economic systems modelled (Callon 1998; 
MacKenzie 2006; Guala 2007; Mäki 2013; Boldyrev and Ushakov 2016). We understand the 
notion of performativity in a broad way; models perform by changing important properties of the 
phenomena they are representing (cf. Mäki 2013).1 This notion has a long history in philosophy 
                                                          
1 Mäki himself is critical of attempts to characterize this type of phenomenon in the context of economic modelling 
in terms of Austin’s notion of performativity, arguing that Austin’s notion is concerned with acts being constituted by 
certain utterances. By contrast, according to Mäki, economic theorizing may have causal consequences for economic 
activity without being constitutive of it. While we do not want to engage in a dispute on whether Austin’s notion is 
apt in this context, we wish here to draw attention to the fact that, like economic models, epidemiological models 
can have causal effects on the systems modelled. 
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of science (see Buck 1963), and economics and the social sciences (see Henshel 1993), often 
referred to as “reflexive prediction” (Buck 1963; Henshel 1993). Predictions (or “prophecies”) 
can be “self-fulfilling” or “self-defeating” or “-frustrating”, understood broadly to mean that the 
dissemination of the prediction is causally relevant in either bringing about the event predicted, 
or its non-occurrence (Buck 1963). Whereas earlier accounts tended to focus on the negative 
aspects of this phenomenon (particularly the difficulties it poses for accurate prediction), 
contemporary work on performativity also emphasises potential positive aspects, particularly, 
how understanding performativity allows us to intervene constructively in the economy (Guala 
2007). 
Despite this sustained discussion, the question of whether epidemiological models might be 
performative has thus far been neglected in philosophical studies of these models.2 We aim to 
make a first step towards closing this gap by arguing, first, that performativity is a phenomenon 
pertaining to epidemiological models, and second, that this has important implications for how 
these models should be regarded and evaluated. We proceed as follows: after sketching some 
important features of epidemiological models, we focus on a model that was used by researchers 
at Imperial College London (ICL) to forecast the pandemic in the UK and the US (Ferguson et 
al. 2020). Using this example, and focused particularly on its use in the UK, we identify three 
ways in which models may be performative: (i) models may influence policy advising; (ii) models 
may affect policy-makers’ responses to an epidemic; and (iii) models may directly influence 
individual responses to an epidemic. While (i) and (ii) are well-documented in the case of the ICL 
model, (iii) is more speculative.3 Having identified the ways in which epidemiological models can 
be performative, we elaborate how their performative aspects may exacerbate the task of 
successfully forecasting the course of an epidemic. At the same time, however, we contend, their 
performative abilities provide an additional way in which these models can be successful, namely 
by changing the course of an epidemic. 
2. Epidemiological models 
Epidemiological models are among the instruments policy makers have used (and continue to 
use) in making policy decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. These models provide highly 
idealized representations of how the virus will spread through a population under a variety of 
assumptions. 
                                                          
2 Some social scientists have described epidemiological models as performative (Rhodes et al 2020), but their focus 
differs from ours, as their main concern is that we should adapt these models to the changing circumstances. 
3 The first two types of “performativity” we outline could apply to any model that is used to inform policy, whereas 
the third sense is more distinctive and methodologically interesting, and it is on this notion that most theorists focus 
(see e.g. the articles in MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu 2007). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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The simplest models are SIR or SEIR models, which assign members of a population to 
different subgroups, “the Susceptible”, “Infectious”, “Removed/Recovered”, or, in the case of 
SEIR models, also the “Exposed”. SIR and SEIR consist of several deterministic equations that 
describe how the proportional sizes of the different subgroups change with time, based on 
transition rates between these groups. This depends on a small number of parameters: the 
transmission rate, the recovery rate, and the latency period. SIR or SEIR models are macroscopic 
models that treat populations as a whole, and abstract from interactions among individuals and 
transmission events. 
The model used by the Imperial College London to model the global evolution of the pandemic 
in different regions of the world is a SEIR model (Walker et al. 2020). By contrast, the 
“CovidSim” model discussed in the highly influential “Report 9” by the Imperial College 
COVID-19 Response Team, upon which we chiefly focus, is an individual-based model 
(Ferguson et al. 2020), in which individuals are assigned to different types of location where 
contacts occur—within the household, at school, in the workplace, and in the wider community. 
Transmission events through contacts among individuals at these locations and movements 
between locations are then modelled. CovidSim is a stochastic model containing a very large 
number of parameters, many of which are only poorly constrained by empirical data. A 
sensitivity analysis (Edeling et al. 2021) has shown that the model is particularly sensitive to 
variations in three parameters: The length of the latent period in which a patient has no 
symptoms and is not infectious; the delay to start case isolation; and, the ‘relative spatial contact 
rate given social distancing’ parameter, which captures the effectiveness of social distancing.4 
3. Three performative aspects of the ICL model 
(i) The ICL model performed scientific advising. 
In a recent working paper, Jonathan Birch (2020) documents how the form in which scientific 
advice was provided in the UK evolved during the early stages of the pandemic, in the lead up to 
the introduction of the ICL model used in Report 9 (Ferguson et al. 2020a). He suggests that the 
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) – the group chiefly responsible for guiding 
the UK’s initial pandemic response – provided advice in three distinctive forms during March 
2020. They began by providing advice in the form of what Birch refers to as “no unconditional 
recommendations”: that is, they presented a list of potentially effective means of pursuing a 
variety of goals that policy-makers might have, with no indication of which goals might be 
desirable or worthy of pursuit. As the situation worsened, by the 9th of March, SAGE shifted to 
                                                          
4 This last parameter in particular will be important in the following. 
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providing advice in the form of “disjunctive unconditional recommendations”; endorsing a 
specific end, but leaving a variety of means open for achieving this end. They did this by 
outlining a range of non-pharmaceutical interventions that they believed could, in some 
combination, achieve epidemic mitigation, and recommending that some subset of these 
measures be implemented (SAGE 2020a). On the 18th of March, shortly after SAGE had begun 
to discuss the ICL modelling paper, the form of advice shifted again, to a “single unconditional 
recommendation”: school closures are required as soon as possible to prevent the NHS from 
becoming overwhelmed (SAGE 2020b). 
Birch traces this trajectory in order to argue that the latter form of advice, while perhaps not 
appropriate in normal situations, is appropriate in fast-moving crisis situations. But he also 
comments in passing on a possible reason for this final shift to advice in the form of a single 
unconditional recommendation. Namely, two days before issuing their single unconditional 
recommendation (on the 16th of March), the SAGE team discussed the ICL modelling paper for 
the first time. This paper displayed data about critical care capacity in the same graph as 
projections about demand for critical care in the absence of strict suppression measures (Figure 
1), revealing, in stark form, the extent to which demand was predicted to outstrip supply, even 
with existing mitigation measures in place. Birch suggests that this might have been the first time 
that some SAGE members were made aware of the dramatic size of the mismatch. The ICL 
modellers also included a single unconditional recommendation in the report on the basis of 
their projections: “epidemic suppression is the only viable strategy at the current time” (Ferguson 
et al. 2020). It is plausible, then, that this model - particularly through the graphical 
representation of its results5 - was instrumental in shaping the form of the scientific advice 
provided by SAGE. 
                                                          
5 The ways in which graphical representations of models and their results may influence how these models are 
adopted is an important topic in the performativity literature; see, for instance, Pahl and Sparsam (2016) in the 




Figure 1: Projected demand for critical care beds under different possible mitigation-based policies is 
displayed together with surge critical care bed capacity; from Ferguson et al. 2020. 
 
(ii) The model performed policy-makers’ responses to the pandemic. 
It is clear that the ICL model had a significant impact on public policy in the UK; immediately 
following the release of Report 9, on the 16th of March, the UK drastically altered (Bosely 2020) 
its previous, mitigation-based strategy (DHSC 2020) and almost all of the ICL team’s 
recommended measures were implemented in the following days (see van Basshuysen and White 
forthcoming). This may have further led, however, to some noteworthy interactions between 
models projecting the trajectory of the pandemic and providing policy advice on their basis, and 
to the response of policy makers. The ICL model and models like it, which project the impact of 
various public policy measures, are designed to provide policy guidance. Their usefulness 
depends on their predictive performance. But the implementation of the recommendations of 
these modellers steers the course of the epidemic away from their reference forecasts. This can 
lead to claims that the model is “too pessimistic”, seemingly based on the idea that the actual 
numbers of those who are infected, hospitalised, or die, do not resemble the model’s projected 
numbers, where these numbers project what will happen in the absence of any interventions or 
behavioural changes, but where mitigation measures have been implemented (see e.g. St. Onge 
and Campan 2020). We might regard this as a distinctive instance of counterperformativity (see 
Mackenzie 2006) – the implementation of the recommended policies serve to steer the real world 
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outcome away from the reference forecast, but notably, in the case of the ICL model, this was 
the exact effect that the modellers were hoping to achieve.6 
Joseph Friedman et al. draw attention to another problem in their evaluation of the predictive 
performance of various international COVID-19 mortality forecasting models. They suggest that 
transmission-based epidemiological models tend to overestimate transmission in their reference 
forecasts, because prolonged exponential growth in transmission rarely continues unabated – 
governments (and/or individuals, see below) will change their behaviour in response to 
deteriorating circumstances--and, we contend, in response to updated modelling projections. The 
accuracy of modelling predictions and projections could be improved, they argue, by taking such 
endogenous factors into account (which, as they note, are often explicitly included in economic 
analyses). In addition, they suggest that models (such as the ICL models) that aim to predict the 
impact of various public policy measures would be better evaluated by looking at the error in the 
difference between the reference forecast and the forecast for the implemented policy. Friedman 
et al. maintain, however, that these counterfactuals can be difficult to gauge. Even when 
comparing the projection concerning the implemented policy to its actual effects, the effects of 
the policy must be somehow distinguished from other factors (2020). It should however be 
noted that economists have made progress in recognising and incorporating endogeneity into 
COVID-19 modelling, which, among other things, can assist in clarifying the role of government 
policy in disease dynamics (see Avery et al. 2020).7 
The belief concerning the inaccuracy and overly pessimistic nature of these models has potential 
further follow-on effects for the implementation of the policy advice on the basis of further 
models. It is possible that the scepticism and controversy surrounding the ICL projections was 
one of the factors that contributed to a reluctance to implement a further, short term, “circuit-
breaker” lockdown when a second wave was unfolding in the UK in autumn 2020 (see Sayers 
2020), which SAGE called for with increasing urgency (Stewart and Sample 2020), on the basis 
                                                          
6 Although this phenomenon has led to criticism of such models for generating inaccurate predictions, and 
comparison of the reference forecast to the actual outcome is used to evaluate the predictive accuracy of these 
models (see e.g. Friedman et al. 2020), it should be emphasised that the projection here is contingent on “no 
measures being implemented” (i.e. this is a conditional prediction). It is helpful here to distinguish predictions, 
which generate statements about future states of the actual world, from projections, which generate statements 
about counterfactual outcomes, conditional on some set of counterfactual assumptions. The performative effect of 
the model consists in influencing which member of a set of projections ends up most closely representing the 
trajectory of the epidemic in the actual world and does not compromise its predictive accuracy. While the model 
steers the trajectory of the epidemic further away from the trajectory in the reference projection, this does not 
undermine the predictive accuracy of the model. Thus, this does not constitute the type of “self-defeating 
prediction” that is the focus of much attention in the performativity literature, where, for example, the prediction 
that an imminent disaster will happen prevents this disaster from happening and thus undermines the accuracy of the 
prediction (see e.g. Henshel 1993). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this distinction. 
7 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making us aware of this work. 
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of mathematical modelling projections (SAGE 2020c). The refusal to implement this advice 
constituted a significant break between scientific advisors and policy makers in the UK (Stewart 
and Sample 2020). 
(iii) The models may have performed individual responses to the pandemic. 
While epidemiological models have influenced individual behaviour through scientific advising 
and policy making, these models may also have been performative in a more unmitigated way; 
changing individual behaviour directly as a result of the information conveyed by the model. In 
the past year governments have introduced a variety of measures to reduce and restrict contacts 
among people with the aim of reducing the spread of COVID-19. The effectiveness of many of 
these measures, however, depends to a significant extent on how the public interprets the threat 
presented by the pandemic, and their willingness to comply with any measures implemented. 
And this in turn depends, at least partly, on how the widely discussed epidemiological predictions 
concerning infection rates or the reproduction rate R0, derived from epidemiological models, are 
understood and interpreted by the public. 
The success of any policy measure is predicated, at least in part, on the degree of public 
compliance with the measure in question. Whether a policy restricting all social gatherings to the 
members of one household plus one additional person—a restriction in place in Germany as of 
the date of writing—can contribute to a reduction in R0 depends on the extent to which people 
abide by this restriction. A particular model may not distinguish between (i) the institution of a 
policy and (ii) degrees of compliance with this policy, simply assuming that instituting a given 
policy will result in universal compliance. But to what extent this idealization is adequate will 
depend on the degree of compliance, which in turn will at least partly depend on how the 
models’ predictions are understood and taken up by the public. The success of many measures, 
furthermore, goes beyond the issue of compliance. Measures such as the abovementioned 
restriction on social interactions are compatible with a wide range of social networks, including 
quite extensive networks. The extent to which such measures slow the spread of infection is thus 
partially dependent on how individuals interpret a policy and how they implement it in adjusting 
their interactions. There are many different ways, for example, of following the ‘one-additional-
person’-rule: I might meet with a large number of different friends individually night after night; 
or I might radically cut down on my social contacts. Both behaviours comply with the rule, but 
the resulting social networks end up looking quite different. Thus not only degrees of 
compliance, but also how a given policy is interpreted and implemented through individual 
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behaviour, is contingent on how serious individuals take the threat presented by the pandemic to 
be.  
This is also the case when explicit policy guidance is lacking – for example, the number of 
infections that result from interactions in the workplace (which is one of the types of interaction 
explicitly modelled in the ICL model) will depend to some extent on how individuals adjust their 
behaviour in response to the model’s predictions. The predictions of epidemiological models and 
how these are understood by the public can thus play an important causal role in changing 
properties of the pandemic—a connection that is further underscored by the empirically well-
supported assumption that people in many places reduced their contacts in advance of the 
implementation of social distancing policies (e.g. Friedson et al. 2020; Sears et al. 2020). In part, 
this may have been due to new information regarding the pandemic, including model 
projections, which have figured prominently in news stories about the pandemic (e.g. Boseley 
2020). 
In short, our modelling efforts interact with the very quantities and properties we are trying to 
model and can thereby change them: epidemiological models and the quantities modelled by 
them exhibit what Ian Hacking has called a “looping effect” (1999, 105). A particularly vivid 
example of this in the case of the CovidSim model is given by the parameter representing the 
effectiveness of social distancing measures. As we have mentioned above, the model’s 
predictions are especially sensitive to changes in the value of this parameter. Yet the effectiveness 
of social distancing measures depends in turn on how the model’s results are communicated to 
and understood by the public. For instance, when people are provided with this information 
through some kind of graphical representation, such as the graph in Figure 1, depicting how the 
demand for critical care beds could greatly exceed capacity, this might make the urgency of the 
situation particularly salient, and it might lead to different reactions than if this information had 
been conveyed through other means. 
4. The role of performativity in model evaluation and appraisal 
Here, we wish to highlight two important ways in which thinking about epidemiological models’ 
performativity can improve our understanding of how to evaluate these models. We consider, 
first, how performative aspects may compound the difficult task of successfully forecasting the 
course of an epidemic and, second, how they might be assessed in light of their ability to change 
the course of an epidemic. 
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Epidemiological models serve dual purposes: apart from their epistemic purpose of forecasting 
the course of an epidemic, they also serve the practical purpose of informing and guiding policy 
making. These epistemic and practical purposes go hand in hand: on the basis of forecasts, 
policy-makers can choose policies that are likely to prevent unwanted outcomes. However, as we 
argued above with respect to some of the ICL’s models, this may steer away the course of the 
epidemic from reference forecasts, which do not incorporate policy or other changes. If a 
modelling study does not include a range of scenarios reflecting different combinations of 
policies (some of which resemble those that will actually be implemented), some of the estimated 
parameters may turn out to be inaccurate due to behavioural changes (e.g. levels of mobility), 
and the forecasts derived from the model may thus be inaccurate, too. There is thus a way in 
which a model’s performative capacities to shape policy making can impair the accuracy of its 
forecasts. 
To be sure, many of the models that have been used to forecast the course of the COVID-19 
pandemic, including the ones we have focused on here (Ferguson 2020; Walker 2020), do 
include a range of scenarios in which different combinations of policies are implemented. This 
allows projections that better resemble the actual policy trajectories followed in a country, and 
models’ predictive accuracy can accordingly be assessed by comparing these projections with 
observed outcomes (van Basshuysen and White 2021; forthcoming). However, gauging the 
accuracy of even these more pertinent scenario forecasts can face significant limitations due to 
the fact that most models abstract from endogenous behavioural responses, such as when 
individuals engage in social distancing even before government-issued directives take effect, 
adopt more rigorous hygiene and personal protection protocols, cancel travel plans, etc. Such 
behavioural responses are poorly understood, difficult to anticipate (Friedman et al. 2020), and 
thus difficult to incorporate into models (which is perhaps why extant models make no attempts 
to include them). For instance, Report 9, described in the previous section, forecasts epidemic 
trajectories conditional on combinations of policies, but not on the spontaneous behavioural 
responses of the population, such as increased social distancing prior to a policy coming into 
effect, or in addition to it. As we noted above, such endogenous behavioural responses may be 
partly driven by the performative abilities of models. But if endogenous responses influence the 
course of the pandemic, this may distort the forecasts by impairing the accuracy of important 
parameter values.8 Furthermore, even sincere efforts at estimating these parameters may be 
                                                          
8 It should be noted that not all distortions due to spontaneous behavioural changes are the effect of performativity 
being in play. A distinction might be drawn here between individuals adapting their behaviour in response to model 
predictions, or in response to other kinds of information, such as current prevalence, which may accrue 
independently of the models in question. It might be difficult, however, to evaluate which mechanisms are in play in 
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limited, as behavioural responses can change over time (such as individuals becoming tired of 
social distancing directives and departing from recommended behaviours) – so there remain 
epistemic challenges even if one endeavours to conscientiously estimate crucial empirical 
parameters, and re-parameterize models on an iterative basis (as is done for some of the models 
we discuss). There are thus limitations to models’ predictive abilities raised by models’ 
performativity. 
Our second point follows on the heels of the first: while the performative aspects of 
epidemiological models can hamper their ability to successfully forecast the course of an 
epidemic, they may nevertheless inform our judgments concerning whether these models have 
been useful in a second way, namely, by changing the course of an epidemic. Here, we emphasise 
that models’ performativity may figure as an important criterion for appraisal beyond predictive 
accuracy. 
When models are performative, their dual roles as epistemic instruments (that predict the 
evolution of a pandemic) and as practical instruments (that inform policy-making through 
reference and scenario forecasts) can make it difficult to evaluate them with respect to each 
purpose individually. The performative effects that these models have on policy and individual 
behaviour can drive outcomes away from the models’ predictions. When the predictions of 
models are undermined, moreover, this seems to undermine their epistemic credentials, making 
them unsuitable as a basis for public policy or individual behavioural response. When we focus 
only on the predictive capacities of such models, we seem to be in a bind here - the more that 
they steer policy and behaviour, the less suitable they seem as a basis for steering policy and 
behaviour (unless they endogenize behavioural response - although, as we have just pointed out, 
this can be difficult). 
One way out of this bind is to move model appraisal beyond focusing on models’ predictive 
performance alone. We thus suggest that both predictive and performative capabilities should be 
considered side-by-side when appraising epidemiological models, which can proceed by 
evaluating some forms of performativity as a desirable attribute (and others as undesirable) in all-
things-considered assessments of what models have done for us, epistemically and practically. 
Following a Kitcher-style view that understands and evaluates science through the roles it plays 
in, and partly for, society, and where those roles often extend beyond purely epistemic ones, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a given case as it may be unclear whether individuals’ sources of information include model results. For our point, 
that performativity may exacerbate the task of forecasting, it suffices that individual behaviour sometimes responds 
to model results, which should be uncontroversial, given that these results and their graphical representations have 




emphasise that a more comprehensive assessment of what epidemiological models have done for 
us (and whether they did so well) should consider their performative aspects, too. 
To use an analogy, consider a medical doctor telling her patient that they are likely to die of a 
heart attack within the next decade if they continue smoking, drinking, and doing little exercise. 
Such a prediction can be performative in helping the patient change their habits, thus escaping 
the unwanted prediction. Likewise, epidemiological models can have the performative ability to 
change important aspects of the phenomena they seek to capture. While this can adversely affect 
their predictive abilities, this does not necessarily imply that a model’s suitability, adequacy, or 
usefulness is diminished, if we consider its performative impact to be a potential virtue. Just as 
we should not think that a doctor is unqualified because she cannot tell whether a patient would 
indeed have died of a heart attack counterfactually, or because she couldn’t accurately forecast 
how much longer, exactly, a patient would live under a changed exercise regime, we suggest that 
it is unhelpful to assess the utility of epidemiological models based on their predictive abilities 
alone. Epidemiological models have been a crucial resource for informing and justifying policy 
interventions, and may have contributed to shaping both the public’s understanding of the 
pandemic, and their behavioural response to it. The ability to make such performative 
contributions can be understood as a desirable feature of these models, even if models’ 
performativity can diminish their predictive prowess. 
It is important to stress, however, that not all forms of model performativity are desirable. We 
might think, for instance, that some performative successes of epidemiological models can also 
have unwanted side-effects, such as when some members of the public begin to take the 
difference between observed outcomes (such as cumulative mortality) and widely publicized 
pessimistic reference scenarios as reason to call the severity or reality of the phenomena being 
modelled into question. One might also worry that by choosing particular outcome variables as 
key modelling targets, such as critical care demand or cumulative mortality, models have been 
performative in making these outcomes relatively more salient than various economic, societal, 
or psychological endpoints, and that models might thereby have contributed to steering policy 
and public response in ways that led to suboptimal societal outcomes.9 We do not take a stance 
on which performative aspects are desirable or undesirable here, but rather highlight that it is 
important to take both kinds into account. 
So how, exactly, are we to take models’ performative aspects into account? Unfortunately, 
numerous complications arise when detailing what role performativity might play in model 
                                                          
9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. 
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appraisal. Should it play an evaluative role, providing a criterion by which the merits or 
deficiencies of models can be judged? Or should it be prescriptive; recommending the 
construction, selection, or use of models with certain performative abilities? The latter view 
seems highly problematic: we do not think that models can (or should) be made better by being 
made more performative, even if particular forms of performativity are uncontroversially socially 
desirable. Deceitfully meddling with a model in order to steer policy or behavioural response 
would raise significant concerns about illegitimate value-influences, and could severely 
undermine the epistemic credentials of models. Models are, and should remain, epistemic 
instruments in the first instance, and while some value-influences are rarely avoidable, model 
construction and use should proceed in epistemically responsible ways (see Elliott and 
McKaughan 2014; Parker and Winsberg 2018 for discussions of the roles of non-epistemic 
values in model construction and use).  
To allay such concerns, we need principles that allow us to acknowledge models’ performative 
aspects, good and bad, while maintaining a commitment to the idea that models’ epistemic 
functioning should remain untouched by considerations about their performativity. 
Unfortunately, formulating such principles, and providing a detailed account of how exactly we 
should weigh or integrate models’ epistemic and performative aspects, involves various 
important and non-trivial questions that cannot be addressed here. These include: on which 
outcomes should we focus when gauging models’ performative effects? How should we weigh 
considerations about models’ epistemic and performative aspects? Should epistemic 
considerations enjoy lexical priority, or are there cases where performative virtues may 
compensate for epistemic shortcomings? Should all performative aspects be considered in model 
appraisal, or are there cases where we should distinguish between the model-as-such, the practice 
of model use, and issues of science communication about model outputs, where evaluations of 
performativity should pertain to the latter two but not the former? We suggest here, for now, 
only the following provisional safeguard: performativity should only play an evaluative, but not a 
prescriptive role in model appraisal. It may figure in judgments concerning whether the 
downstream performative aspects of models have been desirable or undesirable, but such 
judgments should not bear on decisions made at the stage of model construction, selection, or 
deployment – there should be no wishful modelling. Navigating the additional intricacies involved 
in formulating finer-grained principles is beyond the scope of this paper and must be addressed 
in future work. 
13 
 
Finally, we would like to highlight a rather different, and less problematic route to taking models’ 
performativity into account at the stage of model construction: instead of aiming to build models 
with specific performative goals in mind, we can aim to build models that endogenize their own 
performativity. Social scientists, as early as the 1950s, have made efforts to develop analytic 
machinery that can help anticipate the performative effects of public predictions (Modigliani and 
Grunberg 1954; Simon 1954). It thus seems that a fruitful avenue for further research would be 
to investigate how the public’s behavioural response to publicized model outputs as well as to 
policy measures could be captured by epidemiological models. Although we have noted the 
difficulties generated by attempts to incorporate endogeneity, there has been progress on this 
(see e.g. Avery et al 2020; Eksin et al. 2019). Doing so might not only be a promising way to help 
improve models’ predictive capabilities, but would also answer criticisms that social scientists 
have been insufficiently involved in scientific advisory systems that inform policy. One 
important role to be played by social scientists (among many others) can be to directly contribute 
to the predictive endeavours undertaken by epidemiologists, by helping account for and 
anticipate the intricacies of the social and behavioural underpinnings that govern models’ 
performativity. 
5. Conclusions  
We have argued that epidemiological models may have altered the course of the SARS-CoV-2-
pandemic in three important respects: i) through shaping the form of scientific policy advice, ii) 
through shaping policy formation, and iii) through influencing individual behavioural responses 
to the pandemic. Existing philosophical literature on epidemiological models and extant model 
evaluation studies have, however, focused primarily on predictive accuracy, and these 
performative aspects, and their implications, have been largely neglected. Yet, we have proposed 
that it may be important to take the performativity of models into consideration. This is, first, 
because it can exacerbate the difficulties involved in accurately predicting the course of a 
pandemic, and second, because certain types of performativity might be regarded as a desirable 
feature of epidemiological models. It thus might be fruitful to consider, in addition to predictive 
accuracy, the ways in which we can assess the success of models based partially on their 
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